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This paper presents a methodology for incorporating environmental and social equity objectives in
an economic analysis of watershed management.  Empirical results indicate that restricting
agricultural pollution notably increases farm costs. The equity objective also adversely affects
economic efficiency, but the cost increase due to social equity is less significant. For instance, switching from continuous corn or corn-soybean rotation to corn-alfalfa rotation may
1
reduce erosion by 40%. Similarly, corn-soybean rotation may reduce nitrogen runoff  by 10-30% relative to
continuous corn alternative. No-till systems can reduce nitrogen runoff by 24% when compared to
conventional tillage. Herbicide runoff can be reduced by about 70% with no-till and mulch-till practices
whereas over 40% reduction can be obtained with ridge-till (Mellerowics et al.; Putman and Alt; Phillips et
al.; Jones, Selley and Mielke; Prato et al.; Fawcett et al.; Insensee and Sadeghi).
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ENVIRONMENT, EQUITY AND WATERSHED MANAGEMENT
Introduction
Agriculture is the leading cause of environmental degradation and pollution in most
waterways, lakes and aquifers. Runoff from agricultural land transports eroded soil, fertilizers,
pesticides, and sometimes pathogens. In many cases, surface and groundwater pollution levels
exceed the standards set by environmental regulations. For instance, Lake Pittsfield in west central
Illinois has lost 25% of its water storage capacity due to sedimentation, while the concentration of
atrazine in the lake water has reached 13 ppb during some peak runoff seasons, well above the
drinking water standard of 3.0 ppb. At present, economically feasible water treatment alternatives
are not available, but the use of environmentally sound agricultural production practices in the
watershed have the potential to control this phenomenon.
Research results indicate that pollution can be significantly reduced through various
measures including tillage practices, crop and rotation choices, and switching to alternative
chemical mixes.   Some studies have found that pollution control alternatives may yield both
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economic and environmental gains (Setia and Magleby), but this cannot be generalized. In most
cases, conservation practices increase the demand for chemicals which adversely affects pollution
and farm profitability (Zilberman and Marra; Insensee and Sadeghi). Moreover, environmental5
objectives typically involve several attributes, all of which cannot be improved simultaneously. 
Pollution issues in agriculture are best studied at the watershed level (Lowrance). Within a
watershed, each farm’s contribution to environmental degradation and the impacts of regulations
will vary due, in part,  to spatial differences in land and soil characteristics. Therefore,  when
exploring alternative options for watershed management, it may be necessary to spread the
negative economic impacts of policy options as fairly as possible so that the socially desirable
management strategies can be embraced by the participants. Conventional optimization
approaches assume full cooperation and prescribe a resource allocation scheme that optimizes
economic efficiency for the entire watershed. Such schemes usually entail highly specialized
regional production patterns which may be inadmissible to individual groups.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a methodological framework that provides the
capability to integrate economic and environmental objectives while incorporating equity among
participants. This framework will be applied to the Lake Pittsfield watershed in west central
Illinois. The analysis will determine the economic costs that result when atrazine, a widely used
herbicide, can no longer be used within the watershed.  The analysis will investigate the trade-off
between equity and economic efficiency.
Methodology
A mathematical programming model is developed to address the above issues. The model
determines spatial production alternatives, crop rotations, resource allocation and technology
choices that maximize aggregate economic returns to the entire watershed while satisfying













programming models are customary.  Pollution regulations are incorporated by using a chance-
constrained programming formulation (Charnes and Cooper). These will be described later.  The
constraint imposing a minimum equity level, i.e., diversification of economic losses resulting from
pollution regulation, is a novel methodological contribution of this paper. Therefore, this aspect of
the model is elaborated below in some detail. 
Diversity is a widely used concept in ecology (Magurran; Pielou; Weitzman; Solow,
Polasky and Broadus).  Different definitions have been introduced to measure different aspects of
diversity (Magurran; Weitzman).  Here, we focus on structural diversity that measures the degree
of inequality between the entries (attributes) of an outcome vector.  In the present context, the 
outcome vector consists of the economic losses realized by a group of farms resulting from
environmental regulation. For instance, the outcome (1500,500,3000)  assigns $1500, $500, and
$3000 losses to three farms. When compared with this outcome, the outcome vector
(2000,1250,1750) is more diversified since the losses are more equally distributed among the
three farms. In this simple example, the comparison is fairly straightforward. However, the Lake
Pittsfield watershed consists of several subwatersheds, each of which will be represented by a
farm. This complicates the inequality comparison. To cope with this difficulty, this paper




where s=x /￿x . The second half of the above definition presents a useful perspective for ii   j
interpreting what is being measured. Individual attributes are put on a diversity scale where each7
attribute is assigned a scalar index defined as the relative deviation from all other attributes having
a higher relative share, i.e., ￿(s - s) where s >s. The higher the scalar index, the more distant an j  i   j   i
attribute from the attributes above it in the hierarchy. The overall diversity is then defined as the
average of diversity indices attached to individual attributes. The higher the diversity the more
equal the distribution, and vice versa. D(x) attains its maximum value (1.0) when s=1/n for all i, i
and its minimum value (0.0) when s=1 for an attribute i while s=0 for all others (Önal). The i           i
diversity indices calculated for the two outcomes mentioned above are 0.5 and 0.85, respectively.
When determining management strategies aimed at economic efficiency, numerous
alternative distributions of economic losses can occur, each implying a different social equity
(diversity) index. At one end of the spectrum, there is absolute equity which assigns an equal loss
to individual farms. This outcome may be associated with poor economic efficiency. At the other
extreme, a single farm carries the entire loss, while all other farms achieve their unregulated net
returns. This outcome may yield optimum economic efficiency, but with a poor diversity level.
The approach used in this study is to maximize aggregate net return by systematically varying
equity between the two extreme alternatives. This rules out the management alternatives which
yield poorer economic returns or poorer equity among farm groups. An efficiency frontier will be
obtained and trade-offs between economic and equity objectives will be investigated.
The Model
The notation used in the model is as follows: n is the number of representative farms; f,  j,
k, i are subscripts for representative farms, production activities (technology), land categories and
commodities;  p denotes product prices; y  denotes crop yields; c  denotes production costs i      i,f,k,j       i,f,k,jMax M
i,f,j,k
(pi yi,f,j,k ￿ ci,f,j,k) Xi,f,j,k
M
j
Xi,f,j,k ￿ Af,k for all f,k
Lf ￿ If ￿ M
i,j,k
(pi yi,f,j,k ￿ ci,f,j,k) Xi,f,j,k for all f
Lf ￿ L
￿
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M
f,f￿





ri,f,j,k Xi,f,j,k ￿ ￿e/ln(1￿￿)
X i,f,j,k, Lf , U f,f￿, U f,f￿ ￿ 0
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per unit acreage; A  is land availability; I  is maximum net returns without pollution regulation;  f,k       f
r  is pollution (runoff) per unit acreage; e is the pollution standard; ￿ is the equity index; ￿ is i,f,k,j
the pollution safety level (probability); L=(L) is a vector of economic losses under pollution f
regulation; U=(U ) and V=(V ) are positive and negative deviation variables defined for the f,f’    f,f’
difference of loss variables for farms f and f’; and X=(X ) is a production activity vector.  The f,k,j
symbols L, U, V, and X indicate endogenous variables. The algebraic model is as follows:
(2)  







The objective function (2) represents total net economic returns. Constraint (3) reflects land use
balances. Equation (4) is an accounting expression that determines economic losses for the farms.
Equation (5) expresses the difference of loss variables in terms of positive and negative deviation
variables. Equation (6) is a linearized form of the equity constraint D(X)￿￿, where the left-hand
side equals the sum of absolute differences ￿L - L ￿. Details of the linearization technique can be f   f’
found in Önal. Finally, equation (7) is a chance-constrained programming formulation that Chemical loss from cropland is largely due to the occurrence of runoff-producing rainfall soon after
2
the application. Therefore, runoff is a random event and depends on the underlying hydrologic processes
determined by the timing and magnitude of runoff events.
9
restricts total pesticide runoff.   Instead of the standard water pollution level e=3 ppb, (7)
2
incorporates a lower limit so that the pollution will not exceed e with a probability greater than ￿.
The expression on the right-hand side of (7) reflects the assumption that the stochastic nature of
pesticide runoff can be represented as an exponentially distributed random variable. 
Model Specification and Data
The model incorporates alternative crop rotations, tillage practices and input-use
combinations for each land category and each subwatershed. The spatial variability of cropland
within the watershed is captured with a geographic information system (GIS), which subdivides
the watershed into fifty sub-basins based on hydrologic criteria. The sub-basins are then clustered
into seven representative farms, with each farm defined by the cropland contained within these
contiguous sub-basins. Using field-level data from the GIS, each farm is further partitioned into
three distinct land types based on the inherent erodibility of the cropland: non-highly erodible land
(NHEL), highly erodible land (HEL), and extremely erodible land (XHEL). The distribution of
cropland by land type for each of the farms is shown in Table 1.  Local conservation efforts to
control soil erosion restrict the choice of tillage systems on certain land types. Cropland classified
as XHEL is limited to the use of a no-till system when corn is grown, while HEL fields can use
either a no-till or mulch-till system. Clean-till is an option only on NHEL cropland. 
Several weed control strategies are identified which correspond to different levels of
atrazine use: normal, reduced, and  zero.  Each strategy includes both a primary treatment and a
secondary treatment. The primary treatment takes place either before or at planting, while the The modeling technique used to develop atrazine runoff parameters includes: 1) a field-
3
scale biophysical simulation model (EPIC, Williams et al.) which generates event-specific data
relating farm management practices and soil properties to edge-of-field runoff losses; 2) a
regression metamodel that uses regression analysis to explain the observed relationships between
farming practices, soil properties, rainfall patterns, and surface runoff losses that were generated
with the field-scale biophysical simulation model; 3) a pesticide transport model (Haith) for
predicting pesticide losses from a series of  runoff events following application; and 4) a dynamic
watershed response model that integrates the spatial representation of the watershed with the
pesticide loss algorithm to predict aggregate watershed response to various weed control
practices when subject to stochastic rainfall patterns.
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secondary treatment occurs after the crop has emerged. Under the normal option, atrazine is used
in the primary treatment at rates between 1.2 and 1.6 lbs of active ingredient per acre (depending
on the tillage system used). In the reduced option, atrazine use is limited to secondary treatments
at a rate just under one pound of active ingredient per acre. Atrazine is eliminated entirely in the
zero option. Given the recent decision to discontinue the production of cyanazine (a popular low-
cost alternative to atrazine), non-cyanazine alternatives for the reduced and zero options were
also identified. The different weed control strategies are summarized in Table 2.
Each farm’s contribution to the pollution potential in the lake water will depend on three
factors: 1) the choice of tillage system, crop rotation, and level of atrazine use on each land type, 
2) the distribution of soils across land types, and 3) the number of acres of each land type being
farmed. For the sake of space, the methodology and models used to estimate farm-level yields,




The model is first run without imposing the pollution and equity constraints, and under the11
assumption that cyanazine is available. The results presented in Table 3 show that it is optimal for
all farms to use a corn-soybean rotation on all land categories. About 83% of the total corn
acreage uses the mulch-till option while the remaining corn acreage uses no-till on XHEL
cropland. Clean-till is not used on any land category. All farms apply the normal herbicide option 
for producing corn, as expected. For soybeans, no-till is the only tillage system used. This result
defines the unrestricted optimum for production and resource allocation, which will be referred to
as the base case in the remaining of the paper.
The model is then solved by augmenting the pollution constraint (7) to the base case
formulation, with a pollution safety level of ￿=0.99.  Once again the corn-soybean rotation is the
optimum rotation alternative (Table 4). However, two important changes are observed relative to
the base case.  First, a substantial shift to clean-till occurs; 1,163 acres of NHEL cropland shifts to
clean-till, representing 65% of the total corn acreage.  This shift to clean-till occurs because of the
reduced potential for atrazine runoff following soil incorporation.  No-till corn production remains
the same (302 acres), while mulch-till is used on 321 acres of HEL cropland. The second
important change involves the choice of herbicide. Most of the clean-till corn acreage uses the
normal (NORM) herbicide option, but a small fraction, about 7%, uses the zero (ZERO) option.
On the HEL cropland, where mulch-till is used exclusively, the resulting shares of the three
herbicide options are 151 acres (47%), 92 acres (29%), and 78 acres (24%) for normal (NORM),
reduced (RED), and zero (ZERO), respectively. On XHEL cropland, most of the corn acreage,
237 acres (79%) uses the zero option, while the remaining 64 acres (21%) uses the normal option.
The shift to zero and reduced herbicide options (a total of 484 acres) was necessary to satisfy the
pollution constraint which was not imposed in the base run. 12
The aggregate income loss resulting from the environmental constraint would be
approximately $13,200. These losses are not distributed equally among the farms, however. Two
typical cases are shown in Figure 1. Farm-5 loses nearly $3,000 while the loss to Farm-1 is under
$500. The overall equity level, as defined by equation (1), is 0.70 which suggests that only 70% of
the absolute equity is achieved. Because of this unequal distribution of losses, the economically
efficient production and weed control plan that maximizes total net return to the entire watershed
may not be acceptable to the individual farms. The issue is, therefore, to investigate how the
aggregate loss is affected when an improvement in equity is imposed. The overall trade-off curve
in Figure 1 shows that slight losses in total income would occur throughout the equity range 0.70-
0.91. The losses increase faster thereafter. Yet, the total cost of absolute equity, where all farms
lose the same amount of income, is $14,600, which is only $1,400 more than the total loss at the
0.70 equity level. The trade-off curves for three of  the seven farms are also shown in Figure 1.  
Farms 1 and 6 would experience an increase in income loss with greater levels of equity,
suggesting that these farms are relatively more efficient at reducing atrazine losses than other
farms.  Income losses for Farm-5 decrease with increasing levels of equity, suggesting that this
farm was shouldering an inequitable share of the abatement burden at economically efficient
solution. 
Conclusion
This paper introduces a methodology for incorporating environmental and social equity
objectives in economic analysis, and presents an empirical application to a watershed in west
central Illinois. Net economic returns to the entire watershed are maximized while restricting both
the concentration of atrazine in the lake and the economic burden placed any one farm relative to13
group of farms within the watershed. The results indicated a notable cost increase due to the
pollution restriction. The equity objective also adversely affects the aggregate loss, but the
magnitude of this loss is relatively insignificant, approximately 10 percent greater than the loss
realized due to the pollution regulation alone.  Linear programming solutions typically indicate
highly specialized resource allocation schemes which imply unequal allocation of benefits and
losses. The results of this study indicate that both environmental and social equity objectives can
be achieved at the expense of an additional, but relatively small, increase in cost. Although this
solution is not as economically efficient as the linear programming solution, it may be more
politically acceptable to the farms because of its fairness. 
The analysis here focused only on pollution from a particular herbicide. Including
restrictions on gross sedimentation would reduce the shift to the clean-till option and require the
adoption of more expensive weed control systems. Therefore, the reported economic losses are
underestimates of the true costs of regulations. 14
Table 1.  Distribution of Cropland Acreage Among the Seven Representative Farms.
Farm ID NHEL HEL XHEL Total Cropland
1 269.2 71.9 0 341.1
2 341.8 235.3 43.0 620.1
3 422.6 30.5 92.2 545.3
4 436.1 99.4 164.9 700.4
5 505.4 68.0 163.6 737.0
6 124.3 54.4 38.9 217.6
7 216.8 82.4 100.9 400.1
Total 2,316.2 641.9 603.5 3,561.6
Notes: No-till involves planting directly into undisturbed residue from the previous crop. Mulch-
till retains at least 30% residue cover after planting, while clean-till leaves less than 30 % residue
cover after planting.
Table 2.  Alternative weed control strategies (when cyanazine is unavailable).
Normal Reduced Zero
No-till 
Bicep II - EPP Roundup + Dual - PP Roundup + Dual - PP
Banvel - POS Marksman - POS Exceed - POS
Mulch-till 
Bicep II - PRE Dual - PP Roundup + Dual - PRE
Banvel - POS Marksman - POS Exceed - POS
Clean-till 
Bicep II - PPI Dual - PPI Dual - PPI
Banvel - POS Marksman - POS Exceed - POS
Cultivation/Rotary Hoe Cultivation/Rotary Hoe Cultivation/Rotary Hoe13





Farm 1 HEL CO-SB  SB: 35.95 CO: 35.95 0
NHEL CO-SB SB: 134.6 CO: 134.6 0
Farm 2 XHEL CO-SB 0 0
SB: 21.49
CO: 21.49
HEL CO-SB SB: 117.67 CO: 117.67 0
NHEL CO-SB SB: 170.89 CO: 170.89 0
Farm 3 XHEL CO-SB 0 0
SB: 46.08
CO: 46.08
HEL CO-SB SB: 15.25 CO: 15.25 0
NHEL CO-SB SB: 211.28 CO: 211.28 0
Farm 4 XHEL CO-SB 0 0
SB: 82.43
CO: 82.43
HEL CO-SB SB: 49.68 CO: 49.68 0
NHEL CO-SB SB: 218.07 CO: 218.07 0
Farm 5 XHEL CO-SB 0 0
SB: 81.81
CO: 81.81
HEL CO-SB SB: 34.01 CO: 34.01 0
NHEL CO-SB SB: 252.7 CO: 252.7 0
Farm 6 XHEL CO-SB 0 0
SB: 19.45
CO: 19.45
HEL CO-SB SB: 27.21 CO: 27.21 0
NHEL CO-SB SB: 66.77 CO: 66.77 0
Farm 7 XHEL CO-SB 0 0
SB: 50.45
CO: 50.45
HEL CO-SB SB: 41.22 CO: 41.22 0
NHEL CO-SB SB: 108.42 CO: 108.42 0
†Atrazine use for all corn acres in the base case is NORM.14





Farm 1 HEL CO-SB SB: 35.95 CO: 35.95 (ZERO) 0
NHEL CO-SB SB: 134.6 0
CO: 94.96 (NORM),
    39.7 (ZERO)
Farm 2 XHEL CO-SB 0 0
SB: 21.49 
CB: 21.49 (ZERO)
HEL CO-SB SB: 117.67 0
CO: 55.0 (NORM)
      62.67 (RED)
NHEL CO-SB SB: 170.89 0 CO: 170.89 (NORM)
Farm 3 XHEL CO-SB CO: 5.47 (NORM),  0 0
SB: 46.08
  40.61 (ZERO)
HEL CO-SB SB: 15.25 CO: 15.25 (ZER0) 0
NHEL CO-SB SB: 211.28 0 CO: 211.28 (NORM)
Farm 4 XHEL CO-SB CO: 27.63 (NORM),  0 0
SB: 82.43
  54.8 (ZERO)
HEL CO-SB SB: 49.68 CO: 49.68 (NORM) 0
NHEL CO-SB SB: 218.07 0 CO: 218.07 (NORM)
Farm 5 XHEL CO-SB CO: 31.2 (NORM), 0 0
SB: 81.81
     50.6 (ZERO)
HEL CO-SB SB: 34.01 CO: 34.01 (NORM) 0
NHEL CO-SB SB: 252.7  CO: 252.7 (NORM) 0
Farm 6 XHEL CO-SB 0 0
SB: 19.45
CO: 19.45 (ZERO)
HEL CO-SB SB: 27.21 CO: 27.21 (ZERO) 0
NHEL CO-SB SB: 66.77 0
CO: 29.33 (NORM),
     37.44 (ZERO)
Farm 7 XHEL CO-SB 0 0
SB: 50.45
CO: 50.45 (ZERO)
HEL CO-SB SB: 41.22 0
CO: 12.37 (NORM),
28.86 (RED)
NHEL CO-SB SB: 108.42 0 CO: 108.42 (NORM)15
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